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- Quan điểm của bạn đọc:
Giáo sư Lê Xuân Khoa
- Normalization
of Relations
- between the Overseas
Vietnamese and Vietnam
- by Le Xuan Khoa
Forewords:
When posting this article to Giao Diem homepage, we want
to make an apology to all readers for not translating it into Vietnamese at this
point-in-time.
In our point of view, we are not
appreciated to the diplomatic phrase "normalization of relations"..., but it
might be acceptable if the author tries to use it as the rhetoric to the complicated
phenomena in the overseas Vietnamese communities. We also realise that the responses by
eight overseas Vietnamese representing different political views from interviews are only
individual. Otherwise, we found that the article carries out some valuable and meaningful
thought, and we do agree with the author that ‘Many of these expatriates have also come
to believe that participation the renovation process, not confrontation or violence, is
the best way to bring prosperity, freedom and democracy to the country...’
We would like to introduce professor Le Xuan
Khoa to the dear readers. We thank to professor Le Xuan Khoa for contributing this
article.
[Le Xuan Khoa is an adjunct professor and
visiting scholar at the school of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University, Washington, DC.]
- Nguyễn Văn Hóa
- Phụ trách mạng Giao Điểm
"The temple of silence and
reconciliation where the enmities of twenty generations lie buried" (Lord
Thackeray, on the Westminster Abbey)
Early this year, the bi-weekly Ngay Nay
newspaper in Houston, Texas, interviewed eight overseas Vietnamese representing different
political views from the United States, Canada and three countries in Europe. These
people, including myself, were asked the following question:
"Last year, the confrontational
posture between opposing regimes in Asia was subjected to significant changes, the most
important of which was a movement towards normalization of relations between South and
North Korea. In the meantime, both mainland China and Taiwan also made several efforts
towards improving their relationship on various grounds. In such a new political
environment, what do you think the Vietnamese Communist Party and the overseas Vietnamese
community must change in their view on bilateral relationship in order to achieve
democracy and lead the nation out of the current disastrous situation?"
One respondent, former Ambassador Bui
Diem, made his point that since the Vietnamese communist leaders have been so determined
in consolidating the communist party and practicing "a socialist-oriented market
economy" while denouncing "dangerous plots of adversary forces" from the
outside, "fighters for freedom and democracy have no choice other than to continue
their fight with the firm belief that their just cause is strongly supported by the
evolutionary trend of humanity."
Two respondents, Vu Thu Hien and Pham
Hoang, both dissident writers from North Vietnam now taking refuge in Europe, expressed
bluntly that real changes in Vietnam will never happen unless the communist leaders have
to yield under heavy pressure from the outside or serious threats of a general revolt.
Both writers, however, emphasized that in this arduous struggle for freedom and democracy
the overseas Vietnamese can play an effective role as supporters only and must take into
account the moods and aspirations of the people inside the country.
Two other respondents, Le Duy Nhan and
Doan Viet Hoat, held the view that democratization and globalization are the necessary
trend in the post-Cold War era and that Vietnam must integrate fully into the
international community in order to survive and eventually become a developed nation.
Whereas Dr. Hoat insisted that Vietnamese communist leaders must accept political
opposition and initiate a dialogue with other political leaders from inside and outside
the country, Mr. Nhan urged the overseas community leaders to engage in this dialogue when
there is such an opportunity.
Three remaining respondents, Ton That
Thien, Nguyen Gia Kieng and myself discussed the issue of reconciliation from slightly
different perspectives. Both Professor Thien and I observed that the nature of
relationship between the communist state of Vietnam and the Vietnamese Diaspora is not
similar to that which exists between two governments or two sovereign nations as in the
case of the two Koreas, or between mainland China and Taiwan. But Professor Thien asserted
that two Vietnams have existed in reality: at least half of the 78 million Vietnamese (at
home and abroad) do not consider themselves as belonging to a Vietnam unified under
communism. This reality manifested itself clearly during the state visit of President
Clinton last November. To achieve true national reunification, the communist leaders must
take appropriate actions conducive to national reconciliation instead of continuing to
behave as a victorious North occupying an unwelcoming and unsubmissive South. Professor
Thien also urged the "nationalist" Vietnamese to help resolve this national
problem by showing clearly their willingness to bury the hatchet and participate in the
reconstruction and development of their native country if the Vietnamese authorities
truthfully agree to engage in a process of reconciliation, cooperation and normalization
with the expatriate community.
Mr. Nguyen Gia Kieng, who has persistently
promoted national reconciliation for the past twelve years, reasserted that under current
global circumstances, reconciliation between former enemies is no longer a tactical option
but has become a political philosophy of the civilized world. In the case of Vietnam,
reconciliation is a powerful means for the expatriates to prevail over communism. The
current regime is doomed to collapse if its leaders do not accept national reconciliation.
According to Mr. Kieng and his colleagues in the Alliance for Pluralistic Democracy,
Vietnam is in the midst of a transition from a totalitarian regime to a democratic
society. The expatriate community must overcome their past rancor and engage actively in
reconciliation and cooperation with people of good will in Vietnam so as to accelerate the
transitional process and achieve their common goal in the shortest period of time.
My answer to the question posed by Ngay
Nay was that a bilateral relationship has already existed between the Vietnamese
government and the Vietnamese expatriates, although this is basically a de facto
relationship initiated by overseas individuals or groups, mostly for family, business or
humanitarian reasons. In recent years, there have been contacts and consultations between
senior Vietnamese government officials on missions abroad and small groups of Vietnamese
expatriates to discuss issues of common concern "in a frank and constructive
manner."(1) It is evident that the Vietnamese leaders have realized the great
potential of overseas Vietnamese in the industrialization and modernization of Vietnam and
have initiated some policy decisions to ease this constructive relationship. Many of these
expatriates have also come to believe that participation in the renovation process, not
confrontation or violence, is the best way to bring prosperity, freedom and democracy to
the country. However, many legal, psychological and political barriers still exist, and
few people have actually contributed their professional and technological skills to the
development of Vietnam. For the sake of national interest and the welfare of the people,
tremendous efforts to overcome these barriers must be made by both sides, but the first
move towards achieving this goal is primarily the responsibility of the Vietnamese
authorities.
After reviewing different opinions on the
issue of bilateral relationship between the Vietnamese government and the expatriate
community as summarized above, we can see that the majority (five out of eight), with some
difference in focus, supported dialogue as a viable approach towards national
reconciliation and normalization of relations. On the occasion of the 26th
commemoration of the war’s end, it would be worthwhile to re-examine the issue as a
lesson from a painful chapter of history.
National
Reconciliation as a Communist Trick
Non-communist
Vietnamese have never trusted, not without reasons, the good will or sincerity of the
communist party leaders. Since Vietnam regained independence in 1945, history has recorded
at least four harrowing experiences:
- After the Japanese surrender to the Allies in 1945,
nationalist China under President Jiang Jie Shi (Chiang Kai Shek) was given the task of
disarming the Japanese army in Northern Vietnam. Two Chinese commanders on this mission,
Lu Han and Jiao Wen, were also instructed to help install a Vietnamese nationalist
government under the leadership of Nguyen Hai Than and Vu Hong Khanh, resistance fighters
against the French then the Japanese, who had taken refuge in China. To salvage their
fledgling power, communist party leaders negotiated with the two Chinese generals who,
after allegedly pocketing heavy bribes, approved a coalition government which included
Nguyen Hai Than as Vice President and a few other nationalists as cabinet members. The
communist party used this coalition goverment as a smokescreen to stage a ruthless
campaign against all nationalist factions. As a result, for their own safety, Nguyen Hai
Than and his nationalist colleagues had to flee to China or go into hiding.
- In 1969, the communist party endorsed the creation of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) as a neutralist political entity to compete
with the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) for domestic and international
credibility. The PRG action plan revealed that it "is ready to consult with the
political forces representing the various people’s strata and political tendencies in
South Vietnam . . . for the formation of a provisional coalition government based on the
principle of equality, democracy and mutual respect. The provisional coalition government
will organize general elections to elect a national assembly, to build a democratic
constitution fully reflecting national concord and the broad unity of people of all walks
of life."(2) Less than three months later, the PRG and its elder sibling the National
Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF) were buried alive together by the northern
unifiers, leaving their southern parents stunned and furious but incapacitated. As Party
historian Nguyen Khac Vien subsequently explained, "The PRG was always simply a group
emanating from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). If we had pretended otherwise for
such a long period, it was only because during the war we were not obliged to unveil our
cards."(3)
- The Paris Agreement in 1973 included a Hanoi-instigated
article which called for the creation of a Council of National Reconciliation and Concord,
and publicly proclaimed the commitment of all the signatories to resolving Vietnam’s
domestic problems through political means in accordance with the principles of negotiation
and elections. As it turned out, fighting resumed almost immediately after the peace
agreement was signed. Taking advantage of the quick withdrawal of U.S. troops, the drastic
cut of military assistance to South Vietnam by the U.S. Congress and the resignation of
President Richard Nixon, Hanoi ignored the peace agreement, scrapped its own plan to
achieve victory through political means, and conducted a series of attacks which
accelerated the collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975.
- At the May 15 victory celebration, Politburo member Pham
Hung representing the Workers’ Party, solemnly appealed for national unity and
reconstruction with these assuring words: "Only the American imperialists have been
defeated. All Vietnamese are the victors. Anyone with Vietnamese blood should take pride
in this common victory of the whole nation."(4) This statement sounded like a
pre-announcement of a general amnesty resulting from the PRG’s professed policy of
national reconciliation and concord. Therefore, the new authorities’ call for all
soldiers, officers, and officials of the old regime to undergo a period of reeducation,
from three days to thirty days, was accepted as a magnanimous and humane treatment. In
reality, the reeducation period was prolonged for up to fifteen years or more to those
deemed "stiff-necked reactionaries". As revealed by former PRG Minister of
Justice Truong Nhu Tang, the thirty-day directive was only "a ruse intended to mask
the Politburo’s real policy, which was altogether different and vicious and ultimately
destructive to the nation."(5)
In view of these bitter experiences with
the communists, the term "national reconciliation" has become taboo to many
overseas Vietnamese. Some people are practically "allergic" to the term and
automatically label as pro-communist those who want to consider reconciliation as a topic
for discussion with any Vietnamese officials. With full understanding of and sympathy to
these emotional reactions, I sincerely want to present my personal reflections on this
issue. I am doing this as an independent person who has no ambition other than a desire to
contribute something meaningful to the interest of the nation and the people of Vietnam.
National
Reconciliation as the Ultimate Goal
The Vietnamese
communist leaders have been known as cunning and treacherous in the negotiations with
political foes and ruthless in the treatment of their prisoners of war. But if they could
prevail over the Vietnamese nationalists, the French and the Americans before and during
the two Indochina wars, it was not simply because of treachery and brutality, since these
are not uncommon features of opposing sides in any war. Other factors must also be taken
into account including professional training, serendipity, fanaticism and outside support.
Let us re-examine the Vietnamese
communist-nationalist struggle for political power and for the independence of Vietnam. It
was obvious that the communist party was better organized, their leaders better trained
and their cadres more disciplined than their nationalist rivals. As a result, they were
able to seize power in 1945 and monopolize the leadership in the war against France, and
subsequently conduct another war against the United States. During the nine-year war
against France, the communist leadership put their ideology under cover and successfully
rallied the people under the banner of patriotism and national independence. In the
meantime, as mentioned earlier, thanks to the two corrupt Chinese generals who were
supposed to help the nationalists, the communists were able to break up opposing political
parties and force their leaders to either flee the country or join forces with the French,
who promised to support an independent Vietnam under a nationalist government but never
kept their promise. After the partition of Vietnam in 1954, an all-out civil war occurred
between the two regions, with China and the Soviet Union supporting the North and the
United States buttressing the South. The war did not end until twenty-one years later.
France lost the war because its political
leaders were antiquated colonialists hated by both the communists who were leading a war
against colonialism and enjoyed popular support, and the nationalists who were weakened,
divided and grudgingly allied with pro-French politicians. Unlike France, the United
States truthfully wanted to support an independent and democratic Vietnam but also made
many mistakes in handling the war and through inconsistent policies towards the Republic
of Vietnam.
Indoctrinated with communist ideology and
anti-imperialist doctrine, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) engaged in combat with
religious fanaticism and sustained loss of human life and physical deficiencies with
remarkable endurance.(6) In addition, with continuing support from China and Soviet
Russia, communist forces were well equipped and provided for, especially after the 1973
Peace Agreement. "The quantity of supplies transported along the transportation
corridor from the beginning of 1974 until the end of April 1975 was 823,146 tons, 1.6
times as much as the total transported during the entire previous thirteen years . . .
Compared with 1972, the quantity of supplies was nine times as high, including six times
as high in weapons and ammunition, three times the quantity of rice, and twenty-seven
times the quantity of fuel and petroleum products."(7) The communist victory was
almost guaranteed when, following the Fulbright-Aiken amendment which had cut off funding
for all direct or indirect American support activities in the war zone, the U.S. Congress
appropriated only $700 million for South Vietnamese defense for the year ending 30 June
1975, down from $1 billion that had been authorized and less than half of $1.47 billion
requested by the Nixon administration. "In a nakedly mean-spirited act, provisions
were inserted prohibiting even the purchase of fertilizer for South Vietnam in FY
1975."(8) Frustrated by this breach of faith, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker observed
"Had we made good on our commitments, it could well have been a different
story."(9)
This brief review of a painful period in
history is not aimed at criticizing any participating party in the two Vietnam wars, even
if some mistakes are exposed. Since we cannot change the past, it is important to draw
lessons from it with a view to improving the future. Past mistakes cannot be changed but
they can be corrected with new good deeds. Both wars ended decades ago and both France and
the United States have normalized relationships with their former arch-enemy. But
twenty-six years after the end of the second Vietnam war, the relationship with Vietnam
remains a highly complicated and controversial issue within the overseas Vietnamese
community. It is not easy to forget the past, but we need to exert our moral strength to
forgive and to reconcile. In the current global trend towards peace and cooperation among
nations, the issue of reconciliation between former adversaries is of no less importance,
albeit not so urgent, than the resolution of existing armed conflicts. In the case of
Vietnam, for all the mistakes and suffering during the long war and its aftermath, it is
time for all Vietnamese to seriously revisit this issue for the sake of the security and
the advancement of Vietnam as a nation and a people. This is the greatest challenge facing
both Vietnamese at home and abroad; it is also a unique opportunity for people of good
will to make history.
Normalization
of Relations
The ultimate goal --
national reconciliation -- should be defined as an effort to establish peace and
cooperation between the Vietnamese government and the expatriate community, and
concurrently between the government and some components of the Vietnamese society,
including ethnic minority groups, religious organizations, political dissidents and
members of the old regime (Republic of Vietnam). Although efforts should be made by all
parties involved, the initial steps must be taken by those who hold the power. Within the
scope of this paper, my discussion will be focused on the relationship between the
Vietnamese government and the expatriate community. Under current circumstances, it would
be more realistic to aim for normalization of relations as an immediate, more achievable
goal.
Since the inception of the doi moi
(renovation) policy in 1986, the Vietnamese government has realized the great potential of
overseas Vietnamese in bringing about a bright future for the country. Top political
leaders including new Party Chief Nong Duc Manh, President Tran Duc Luong and Premier Phan
Van Khai and their predecessors have insisted that the overseas Vietnamese constitute
"an inseparable part of the Vietnamese people" and appealed them to "close
the painful chapter of past history and help achieve the goal for a prosperous people, a
strong country, an equitable, democratic and civilized society." In the wake of the
recent Ninth Party Congress, Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Dinh Bin, concurrently
Chairman of the Committee on Vietnamese Residing in Foreign Countries, reaffirmed his
appreciation for the capital and intellectual capacity of overseas Vietnamese.
"Though having a different political viewpoint, they (overseas Vietnamese) always
maintain their national pride deep in their heart and expect the country to become a
developed country... They are a precious internal force of the country, including capital
and intellectual sources. They are becoming our potential partners in a near future,"
he said. (10)
In fact, overseas Vietnamese have already
made important contributions to the economy of Vietnam, mostly through friends and
relatives. They have been a substantive source of support for Vietnam, especially in its
gloomiest years before doi moi. This assistance has increased consistently. Last
year, 2.5 million expatriates sent home US$1.2 billion through official channels, but if
remittances through unofficial channels and the spending of visiting overseas Vietnamese
were also included, the estimated total would be at least US$3 billion, almost one-eighth
of Vietnam’s GDP. In business activities, overseas Vietnamese have invested in 533
projects worth $252.6 million and opened 100 companies and representative offices in
Vietnam. These figures would be much higher if Vietnam had put in place a reliable legal
structure and an effective administrative system, at both local and national levels. In
the long run, as the younger generations become less attached to their parents’ or
grandparents’ native land, financial assistance to relatives and friends will be
decreasing to virtually nil, but large amounts of money will likely be spent in
investment, trade and other business ventures. The fact that the overseas Chinese account
for 80 percent of all foreign investment in China (11) can shed some light on the prospect
of overseas Vietnamese doing business in Vietnam although the Vietnamese, by tradition,
are not so business-oriented and entrepreneurial as the Chinese.
In order to become an industrialized and
modernized country, Vietnam is desperately in need of advanced knowledge and technological
skills. Overseas scientists and other professionals are precisely "a precious
intellectual source," as asserted by Mr. Nguyen Dinh Bin. However, they have not
responded to Vietnam’s appeals as positively as they have for humanitarian assistance
and business activities. According to Mr. Bin, "around two hundred overseas
Vietnamese scientists return to the country each year to give lectures and carry out
consultation." This number remains far below the level expected from over 300,000
talented Vietnamese among the expatriate community. Greater effort must be made, primarily
by Vietnam, to overcome psychological, legal and political barriers that hinder the
intellectual contribution of the overseas Vietnamese. Meetings between government policy
makers and overseas individuals or groups, which have already begun, should be continued
and expanded to address issues of common concern in a frank and constructive manner. These
exchanges of views, conducted in a spirit of mutual respect, would help smooth out
differences, alleviate tensions and legitimize contributions of overseas Vietnamese toward
the realization of "a prosperous people, a strong country, an equitable, democratic
and civilized society." These goals, however, can be achieved only when words are
translated into actions, promises into realities.
Reconciliation, rule of law, and democracy
are the right solutions to the three psychological, legal and political problems mentioned
above. Conciliatory gestures including recognition of some past mistakes and a series of
economic, administrative and political reforms on the part of the Vietnamese government
will be applauded not only by overseas Vietnamese but also by all democratic countries.
Although political reform has long been resisted by Vietnam, democracy has recently been
touted as a new goal in the national slogan. Although a culturally appropriate form
of democracy for Vietnam might need to be defined, the universal principles of democracy
must be respected and put into practice. In the meantime, current ethnic and religious
problems must be resolved on the basis of these principles resulting in at least some form
of modus vivendi as a transitional measure.
Vietnamese political leaders have been
denouncing "peaceful evolution" as a "conspiracy of hostile forces."
It is an odd accusation since peaceful evolution per se is beneficial unless
"chaotic regression" is preferred. If the Vietnamese government takes the
initiative on peaceful evolution, it can pre-empt hostile forces (if they really exist)
and prevent them from instigating chaos or revolt. President John F. Kennedy once proposed
"peaceful revolution" and praised it as a necessary socio-political approach to
avoid violence. "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent
revolution inevitable," he said.
A young Vietnamese American physician, an
eloquent advocate for humanitarian assistance to Vietnam, has rightly observed that
"In nature, all change that is sudden is usually catastrophic... The examples in
nature abound that gradual transitions, peaceful evolutions are always more productive
than abrupt and violent transformations."(12) This step-by-step process, however,
must be steadily forward and, in the case of Vietnam, each step must reach further than
those made by other Southeast Asian countries, otherwise Vietnam will be permanently left
far behind by its neighbors.
Prospects
for the Future
Just a week ago, the
Ninth National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party selected Mr. Nong Duc Manh to be
the new Party Secretary-general. It also restructured the Party leadership by deleting
three advisory positions in the Politburo and replacing four politburo members. Central
Committee membership was trimmed from 170 to 150, half new members, and the five-member
politburo Standing Board were replaced by a nine-member Secretariat.
In his nine years as National Assembly
speaker, Mr. Manh has been considered by Vietnam watchers as a reform-minded leader and a
skilled consensus builder. In his acceptance speech, Mr. Manh said the Ninth Party
Congress opened "a new era" for national development. "The future of our
nation is very bright, but there will be not a small number of difficulties and
challenges... The success of the reform process depends on our ability to grasp
opportunities and overcome dangers... Many strong solutions like supervision,
scrutinization (sic), and administration reform, will be continued to implement democratic
revolutions. The system has to be clean, strong and effective." Mr. Manh also urged
the party to "correct the mistakes and fight against negative phenomena, particularly
corruption, bureaucracy, waste and social evils... This battle is a life or death struggle
for the regime," he said.(13) In a recent interview with Saigon Giai Phong (Liberation
Saigon), Mr. Nong Duc Manh again emphasized the need for continued renovation, "I
think that only by enhancing internal unity, continuing doi moi, taking advantage
of intellectuals and developing democracy, can Vietnam overcome poverty and backwardness,
and build an equal, democratic and civilized society."(14)
Despite these encouraging statements, the
Party remains a closed political entity and it will take some time for international
obervers to have a clear idea whether Mr. Manh can live up to his reputation as a
reformist and a consensus builder. At this stage, a cautiously optimistic view about the
future of Vietnam is appropriate. With regards to the relationship with the overseas
Vietnamese, Mr. Manh might have greater latitude to exert his skill as a bridge builder.
In a meeting with a group of Vietnamese American professionals in Washington, DC on his
way to the International Conference of Parliamentary Leaders in New York City last August,
the then National Assembly speaker reaffirmed the great potential of overseas Vietnamese
in enabling Vietnam to become a developed country. He emphasized the need for consultation
between country leaders and overseas intellectuals on issues of common interest.
Appropriate measures would be taken in response to the constructive recommendations, even
critical comments, of people in good faith. It was in this meeting that Mr. Manh announced
the addition of "democracy" to the government’s national slogan.
We look forward to more opportunities for
such frank and constructive exchanges of views and active participation of overseas
Vietnamese in the building of a prosperous and democratic Vietnam. One good reason for us
to be optimistic about Vietnam’s future is the presence of thousands of Vietnamese
students in foreign countries. In the U.S. alone, in addition to the regular flow of
students admitted to a number of colleges and universities every year,(15) a public law
entitled "Vietnam Education Foundation Act of 2000" was promulgated last
December "to further the process of reconciliation between the United States and
Vietnam and the building of a bilateral relationship serving the interests of both
countries."(16) Students from Vietnam will sooner or later mingle with overseas
Vietnamese students of the same generation. Unlike their parents, the younger
generation has little or no painful memories of the past and can be more candid and
productive in their work, cooperatively or separately. Most significantly, they can do
wonders for Vietnam in the community of nations.
April 30, 2001
Notes
- Proposed as basis for discussion by Le Xuan Khoa and agreed
upon by Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Dinh Bin at a meeting at SAIS, Johns
Hopkins University, June 9, 2000.
- Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir (New York:
Vintage Books, 1986), p. 336.
- Ibid., p. 268.
- Ibid., p. 264.
- Ibid., p. 274.
- By all accounts, communist Vietnam lost more than 1.4
million of its soldiers in the war, as opposed to 58,000 Americans and 250,000 South
Vietnamese.
- Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the
People’s Army of Vietnam, II: 473-475, quoted by Lewis Sorley, A Better War (San
Diego, New York, London: A Harvest Book, Harcourt Inc., 2000), p. 372.
- Lewis Sorley, Ibid., p. 367.
- Ibid., p. 383.
- Investconsult Group’s website, Vietnampanorama,
April 26, 2001.
- John Naisbitt, Megatrends Asia (New York, Touchtone
edition, Simon & Schuster Inc., 1997), p. 20.
- Nguyen Hoai Duc Tri, "Returning to Vietnam, an
Alternate Perspective", paper submitted to the Vietnamese Medical Association, 2000,
p. 1.
- Vietnam Investment Review, April 23, 2001.
- Saigon Giai Phong, April 25, 2001.
- Currently, there are about 2,000 students from Vietnam in
the U.S.
- Public law No.106-554, 12/22/2000, section 206. According
to this law, a Vietnam Debt Repayment Fund
will be established to receive all payments made by Vietnam under the U.S.-Vietnam debt
agreement. Beginning with fiscal year 2002, and each subsequent fiscal year through fiscal
year 2018, $5,000,000 of the Fund will be made available to the Vietnam Education
Foundation to award fellowships to Vietnamese nationals to study at institutions of higher
education in the U.S., and to U.S. citizens to teach in Vietnamese institutions in Vietnam.
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© Giao Điểm. Bài vở đóng góp, thư từ và ngân phiếu
xin gởi về: Giao Điểm, PO. Box 2188 Garden Grove, CA.92842, USA. Bài đã đánh
vi tính, xin gởi attachment về email: hoa63@hotmail.com |
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